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DAY AND NIGHT LAW SCHOOLS

A recent report published under the auspices of the
United States Department of Interior, discloses the astonishing fact that more students enroll in night law schools than
those gaining their legal education during the day. The report
according to the survey made, lists 24,536 students enrolled in
night law schools as compared with 19,954 students attending
day schools. The cost of the night law school too averages
$145.00 as compared with $212.00 as the average for the day
school. Twenty-eight staites have within their boundaries a
total of 85 night law schools, as compared with 99 day schools
in 43 states. The State of California leads all other states with
seven day law schools and ten night law schools. Six day law
schools restrict their enrollments to men only, while the Portia
Law School, at Boston, restricts its students to those of the
female sex.
SPEED IN THE ENGLISH COURTS

The Practice book promulgating the procedure in English Courts, contains 72 orders embodying 1045 rules dealing
with every possible contingency. Before the trial is had much
of the testimony has already been taken through interrogatories, affidavits of witnesses and through Referees. If a litigant desires to orally give his testimony the Master of the
Rolls of the Chief Justice handling the case must be presented
with strong recommendations and good reasons before consent
is granted. The rules limit the time to appear, answer, file
particulars, interrogatories and other similar matters, within
a certain number of days not exceeding eight. After a defendant appears in response to a summons, a Master ascer-
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tains the basis of the suit and the defenses involved, and thereupon orders the various time within which the case proceeds.
A typical order to plead is as follows:
Statement of the claim containing full particulars within
5 days; Defense containing full particulars 3 days thereafter;
Reply in case of counterclaim, 2 days thereafter.
The English Courts have reduced litigation to a matter
of days, not weeks and months. The advantages can easily
be seen.
APPELLATE COURTS

The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, to obtain relief
for the Judges who are incapable of handling the tremendous
increase in cases being appealed, is employing law clerks to
assist. The clerk relieves the Judge of a great deal of research
work, analyzing facts, checking authorities presented to determine if they are point and generally facilitating decisions
upon appeal. A similar system is now being employed by the
United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of
Arkansas.
UNLAWFUL PRACTICE

The legal aid department of the Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen Grand Lodge recently was discontinued after an
injunction suit was filed against it in Ohio for unlawfully
practicing law. The membership of the Lodge is nationwide
and contains an estimated 180,000 members. The legal aid
department gave legal advice through an attorney to its members. In case of litigation 5% of the claim was assigned to
the Lodge to defray the costs of maintaining the Department.
By agreement of all parties a new plan was adopted by the
Lodge so as to satisfactorily remedy the situation.
ORGANIZATION OF BAR EDITORS

On April 23, a circular letter was addressed to 37 editors
of known Bar Periodicals, suggesting an organization of such
editors to cooperate to assemble, digest and transmit current
professional news to its members. The response from the
editors addressed was heartily in favor of such an organization.

REPORT OF JUSTICE COURT COMMITTEE
HE undersigned members of the committee were appointed to investigate and report concerning the complaints recently made through the public press of the
city and county of Denver as to certain conduct of Denver's
justices of the peace. Thereafter, at request, the scope of our
inquiry was enlarged to include the entire field of the justice
courts, including the justices, clerks and constables. Your
committee respectfully reports as follows:
1. Prior to the adoption in 1902 of Article XX of the
Colorado constitution, creating the City and County of Denver, the justices of the peace in Denver, like other justices of
the peace, received compensation through the collection of
fees provided by the statutes of Colorado for official services
of such officers.
2. By said Article XX of the constitution of Colorado
it is provided: "If any officer of said city and county of
Denver shall receive any compensation whatever, he or she
shall receive the same as a stated salary, the amount of which
shall be fixed by the charter, and paid out of the treasury of
the city and county of Denver in equal monthly payments."
3. In accordance with the foregoing constitutional provision, there were incorporated in the charter of the city and
county of Denver, adopted in 1904, provisions for the payment of salaries to all officers of the city and county. Section
153, now section 318, provides that Denver's two justices of
the peace shall each receive an annual salary of $2,000.00.
The charter does not classify constables as "officers." Hence
they come under the heading of "clerks and employes." The
salaries of the constables and clerks are not fixed by the charter
of the City and County of Denver, or by any special ordinance, but are stated in the annual appropriation ordinance,
known as the "budget." At the present time these salaries
are: Constable and chief clerk, $150.00 each per month;
Deputy constable and deputy clerk, $125.00 each per month.
The charter, section 176, says of the justices: "Each shall
appoint his own constable and clerk." The only authority for
the salaries of the constable and clerk is in the budget ordinance.

222

DICTA

Several provisions were written into the charter forbidding salaried officers receiving any compensation other than
their salaries.
By section 221, now section 108, it is provided: "No officer, deputy, clerk or employe of such officer, shall receive or
accept any fee, compensation or payment, other than his salary
as now or hereafter fixed by this charter, or by ordinance, for
any work or service performed by him of any official nature,
or under color of office, whether performed during or after
official business hours."
By section 159, now section 304, it is provided that "no
officer shall be paid any fee or compensation beyond that fixed
by the charter."
By an amendment adopted February 14, 1913, now section 312, it is provided: "No official or employe shall solicit
or receive any pay, commission, money or anything of value,
* * * except lawful compensation or salary as such officer
or employe."
4. The charter commands that all fees collected by public officers or employes for their services, shall be by such
officers or employes paid into the treasury of the city and
county. See section 221, now section 108; also section 222,
now 109; section 223, now 110; and section 159, now section
304.
It is clear from the foregoing that since the adoption of
the charter no officer or employe of the city and county has
had any right to receive or accept any compensation for public
services, other than his salary, and further, that it is and has
been the duty of such officers and employes to turn in to the
treasury of the city and county all fees legally collected.
5. Section 7890 of the Compiled Laws of Colorado (an
act of the General Assembly passed in 1891 ) sets forth a schedule of fees in the justice courts consisting of twenty-eight
items, ranging from five cents to one dollar. The total justice's fees in any civil case shall not exceed five dollars. Under
the law it has been and is the duty of the justices of the peace,
clerks and constables to charge the fees fixed by the statute,
and no more. No justice of the peace, clerk or constable is
entitled to charge or collect any fee for any service unless such
charge is authorized by law.
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6. Many years ago, probably long prior to the creation
of the city and county of Denver, it became the established
custom in Denver for justices of the peace to require the
plaintiff, at the time a suit was begun, to deposit with the
justice $3.00 in an ordinary civil case, and $5.00 in an attachment case, to cover the costs for services to be performed.
This requirement of a deposit in advance on account of costs
has been continued down to the present time. It is a practical
necessity that such a deposit be required, because under the
law, officers are required to collect the legal charges in advance. It is necessary, however, that there be refunded to the
litigant at the close of the litigation all unearned costs. Otherwise, the requirement of such a deposit would amount to an
illegal charge where the total earned fees do not amount to as
much as the required deposit. After the creation of the city
and county of Denver, at intervals, some of the justices refunded the balance of the deposit, if any, over and above the
earned fees, to those litigants who demanded such refund.
7. A. T. Orahood became justice of the peace on June 1,
1923. On that day letters were sent from the office of the
Auditor of the city and county of Denver to Justices of the
Peace Orahood and Bray, as follows:
DENVER
OFFICE OF THE

AUDITOR
GEo. D.

BEGOLE,
AUDITOR

WM. H.

McNICHOLS,
DEPUTY

June 1, 1923.
Hon. A. T. Orahood,
Justice of Peace,
Court House, City.
Dear Sir:
In accordance with conference held this date, we will endeavor, starting
tomorrow morning, June 2, to establish a flat fee system in the Justice Courts
and we feel that the same will meet with the approval of every practicing
attorney in the city.
In accordance with the above you will, effective on the above date make
the following charges in the Justice Courts, namely:
$3.00
For filing straight suit ..........................................
. F. E. and D. suits .........................4.00
" attachment suits ..................................
5.00
.

R eplevin suits .............................................
5.00
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For filing A nsw er .............. ............................-. ................................ 2.00
(I
." Intervention
-.............................................................. 5.00
D ocketing change of Venue
2...............................................
2.00
For Jury ... .........
............................ . . 3.50
A lias A ttachm ent w rit ........................................................................
1.50
These charges will carry the case in its entirety to and including judgment and due to the fact that you will place no limit upon reasonable continuances and services to that point, there should be no refunds for unearned
costs, as we feel that these two items will offset each other.
The following charges will be made for services after judgment:
Executions ........
.
.....................................
$2.00
Execution and garnishee .........................................................
3.00
T raverse s .......................................................................................................
2 .00
T ranscripts ..............................................
. . . . ...........1.00
A ppeals .....................................................................................................
. 1.50
R estitu tion ...................................................................................................
2.00
Foreclosure on M echanic's lien ......................
................... 6.00
We will appreciate your posting this notice in the office of your courts
and seeing that the same is made effective immediately.
Yours very truly,
GEO. D. BEGOLE,
By I. H. MERRITr,

Asst. Deputy.

When these letters were written, Justices Bray and Orahood posted the same in their offices, and since that time the
justices have followed the fee system therein outlined. When
Justice White, in 1924, succeeded Justice Bray, he found in
operation this flat fee system, and he has since followed it.
The fees fixed in the foregoing communication are without any legal basis. They are not in accordance with the
statutes of Colorado. The direction that no refunds be
allowed is also illegal.
At the time Justices White and Orahood were appointed,
a practice or custom was in existence of the justices, clerks
and constables making and collecting certain charges not
mentioned in the said letter, and retaining the same as compensation in addition to stated salaries. This practice has
been continued by Justices Orahood and White. There has
never been any legal justification for this practice.
The following fees have been charged and retained by
the justices: Jury fee, $2.00; Granting change of venue,
$1.50; Criminal bond (in business hours), $2.00; Criminal
bonds taken after business hours, $15.00. The constables have
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charged and retained $5.00 on execution sales, and the clerks
have made small charges for making out papers for litigants
when so requested by them.
8. On September 23, 1931, after a conference with certain public officials of Denver, the two justices sent the following written communication to Carl S. Milliken, Commissioner of Safety.
CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER
JUSTICE COURT

September 23, 1931.
Hon. Carl S. Milliken,
Commissioner of Safety,
City Hall, City.
Dear Sir:
Pursuant to our conversation this morning and effective at once, for those
desiring Justice Court criminal bonds on Sundays, holidays, nights and out Of
working hours, we will make a charge of $15.00.
Respectfully,
WALTER E. WHITE,
ALBERT T. ORAHOOD.

This letter was thereupon posted at the city hall for the
information of the public. Since the date of said letter, the
charge of $15.00 for taking and approving criminal bonds out
of office hours has been collected by the justices, and retained
by them as compensation for their services. This practice of
charging said $15.00 had been agreed upon with said city
officials at the aforementioned conference. Under the Colorado statute, the fee of a Denver justice of the peace for taking
and approving a criminal bond at any time is twenty cents.
The charge which the justices were making of $15.00 for
taking and approving criminal bonds out of office hours, was
known to the city attorney's office, and no objection was made
thereto by said office.
9. Under the law of Colorado a party answering a writ
of garnishment in a justice court is entitled to be paid eighty
cents. The justices in Denver have therefore always collected
said eighty cents from the party who causes a garnishment
writ to issue, the said eighty cents being included in the $5.00
docket fee in garnishment cases. Many parties who answer
garnishment writs do not call for this eighty cents, and the
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moneys thus left remaining in the hands of the justices amount
in the course of time to a considerable sum. There is no law
authorizing a justice of the peace to turn this money into the
treasury of the city and county. Until such a law is passed,
it is the duty of the justices to hold the said money subject to
the demand of the various parties to whom it is due. Justices
White and Orahood are not subject to criticism for retaining
said money until a law is passed (which should undoubtedly
be enacted) requiring such fees to be paid into the treasury
of the city and county. Such a law has recently been passed
with reference to similar funds in the district and county
courts.
10. The committee finds that the published statement
that Justice of the Peace White has failed to turn over to the
city $15.00 in costs alleged to have been collected in the Edleman case is unfounded. The $15.00 mentioned was never paid
into the court.
11. By the adoption of practices hereinbefore set forth,
some of which have been concurred in by certain of the city
and county officials, it is the opinion of the committee that
the city and county has received fees in a large amount to
which it was not entitled, and that it has been deprived of
other fees to which it was entitled. Only a long and expensive,
and in our opinion, a useless audit, could determine these
amounts. So far as the committee can learn from the audits
already made and in progress, neither of the justices is in any
way intentionally short in his accounts.
12. The Colorado statute provides for a fee of $1.00 to
a justice of the peace for performing a marriage ceremony
and making return. It frequently happens that there is tendered to a justice a larger amount than $1.00, and it has been
the custom at all times for the justices to accept such gratuities.
Justices White and Orahood have accounted to the city and
county for the $1.00 fee. It has recently been suggested that
they are under obligation to account to the city and county for
the gratuities just mentioned. Your committee does not think
so. The city and county has no right to receive more than the
one dollar statutory amount.
The question has also been raised as to whether or not
it is a violation of law for a justice of the peace to accept more
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than the statutory fee of one dollar for the performance of a
marriage ceremony. It will, of course, be admitted by everyone that it would be contrary to public policy to permit a
justice of the peace to receive any gratuity for the performance of a judicial duty. The performance of a marriage
ceremony, however, has no connection with judicial service,
and there would seem to be nothing contrary to general public
policy for a justice of the peace to accept a voluntary offering
of more than one dollar for such a service. But the matter
cannot be left to general reasoning or to a determination on
general principles of right and wrong. The question in this
instance is determined by the charter of the City and County
of Denver, which provides: "No officer * * shall receive or
accept any fee, compensation or payment, other than his salary
as now or hereafter fixed by this charter, or by ordinance, for
any work or service performed by him of any official nature,
or under color of office, * *

The committee, however, is not unanimous on the question as to the foregoing provision of the charter applying to
the gratuities hereinbefore mentioned.
13. Litigation in the justice courts has increased enormously since 1920. Taking the data in the Denver Bar Association Docket of March, 1927, and comparing it with the
records of 1931, we find the following figures:
Criminal Cases
Civil Cases
1272
1920, Justice Rice ..............
458
3765
1931, Justice White ..........
913
4507
1931, Justice O rahood .............................. 771
(These are the total number of criminal cases filed, but the number of
defendants is much greater, as in many cases there were several defendants.)

For the last two years Justice White has averaged 312
civil cases, and Justice Orahood 378 civil cases a month.
Criminal cases are filed in each court by alternate months,
this system having been inaugurated when the justices also
acted as police magistrates, so as to enable them to spend
alternate months in police courts in the morning.
These figures, and the experience of the Bar, conclusively
demonstrate that the justices are very much overworked. The
1904 charter, when Denver's population was about 140,000,
provided for three justices; now with almost 300,000 people
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and more than three times as much business, there are only
two justices.
Eight hours work is the regular working day for city
employes. Yet neither justices nor constables, under the charter, are entitled to extra fees for night work. Justices are
called from their sleep to make bonds, and constables must
make many of their seizures in attachments, especially of
automobiles, between 6:00 P. M. and midnight. Such a
system is wrong.
CONCLUSIONS

The acts of the justices complained of in this case seem
to have been done through a mistaken view of the law, or in
ignorance of what should have been done. To a considerable
extent they simply followed illegal practices already established when they took office. They made no attempt, so far
as the committee can learn, to conceal in any way the charges
which they were making for services, nor the fact that certain
fees and charges were retained by them as compensation in
addition to their salaries. In other words, there has been no
attempt to conceal what has been done. In a large measure,
or to some extent, at least, what has been done has been with
the approval, either directly or tacitly given, of public officials
of the city and county of Denver. No objection has been
made until recently by any members of the Denver bar to the
charges collected by the justices. Justices Orahood and White
have both borne a good reputation, and it is the consensus of
opinion of the bar that in their judicial decisions they have
acted ably, impartially and without fear or favor. It is to
their credit that they have voluntarily resigned from their official positions. We believe that the justices are honest in the
statement made in their letters of resignation, viz: "We know
that we will be believed by the bar when we say that we have
not collected any fee or retained any fee to which we did not
honestly believe we were justly entitled."
Your committee deems it proper to add to its report, however, that any system whereby justices receive fees in addition
to compensation allowed by law must be condemned in no
uncertain terms, and that the taking of illegal fees by judges
can under no condition be condoned. Fees of clerks and con-
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stables should, of course, be limited to compensation allowed
by law.
RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The committee is of the opinion that the Colorado
statutory fee bill should be strictly complied with until it is
changed by law. This conclusion is reached entirely regardless of the additional work and expense which may be involved in complying with that method, or the difficulty in
auditing the accounts. The practice of the justices retaining
any fees should be at once abandoned. The fees collected
for the city and county should be turned over monthly to the
county treasury. The eighty-cent garnishment fee should be
deposited by the justice in a trust account for payment to the
garnishee, until the law makes provision for further disposition of such funds. No charge for service performed at any
time should be in excess of the legal charge.
2. A law should be enacted revising the present fee bill,
which was established over forty years ago. The new law
should provide for a deposit to be made in advance to cover
fees, and a return of unearned fees, or else a reasonable and
definite amount should be required to be paid in advance to
cover all fees to be charged by the justice. The committee
recommends the latter plan.
The schedule of all fees that can be charged should be
posted in each of the justice's courts.
3. Unquestionably the compensation of the justices of the
peace should be increased by an amendment to the charter.
$2,000.00 a year is absolutely inadequate. The committee
recommends that the salaries be increased to $3,000.00 per
year.
4. The number of justices should be flexible to conform
to the needs of Denver, and the number thereof should be fixed
by ordinance of the city council, and not by the charter. We
need at least three justices at the present time, in addition to
the police magistrate.
5. The present charter provision by which the mayor is
required to appoint the justices of the peace is fundamentally
unsound. The justices should be elected by the voters, and
should appoint their own clerks and constables, and have complete control over all subordinate officers and employees. The
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administrative work of the justice courts should be consolidated so that justices may sit for each other, and so that there
will be one clerk's office and one chief constable, with sufficient deputy clerks and constables to furnish one of each for
regular night assignment.
6. The committee further recommends that the Bar
Association either continue this committee or appoint a new
committee to draft the necessary revisions in the state constitution, statute, charter or ordinances to carry into effect the
foregoing recommendations.
Respectfully submitted,
HORACE N. HAWKINS.
ERNEST L. RHOADS.
PHILIP S. VAN CISE.
WILBUR F. DENIOUS.
IRA C. ROTHGERBER.

A BETTER BAR OUTING
A large attendance is expected at the Fifth Annual Bar
Outing to be held June 16 at Mount Vernon Country Club,
because of the following changes in this year's program:
Six good prizes will be given in each event.
The Championship contest between the two winners of
the Judges' horseshoe tournament and the two winners of the
lawyers' and guests' horseshoe tournament should be at least
interesting, if not amusing.
THE SOLITAIRE COWBOYS of Radio Fame will
entertain during dinner and following dinner, in place of the
vaudeville shows heretofore held.
The program will conclude promptly at 9 P. M., following which the members and guests will be allowed to arrange
their own games, implements for which will be provided.
WE HAVE WORKED ALL WINTER.
COME AND PLAY.
CHAS. J. MUNZ, JR., Chairman,
Bar Outing Committee.

REPORT OF NEW COURT HOUSE
COMMITTEE
HE following is the report of the New Court House
Committee of the Denver Bar Association:
Immeditely following the appointment of the
committee conferences were held with Mr. Robert K. Fuller,
president of Allied Architects, and with Mayor Begole, who
cooperated with the committee. On August 1, 1931, the general contractor had completed less than one-half of the work
to be performed by him. The committee was therefore able
to arrange for some changes in the interior of the building
which it considered it advisable to make at very little additional expense. Changes which the committee, with the efficient and cordial cooperation of Mr. Roland L. Linder and
of Mayor Begole, are as follows:
The jail was eliminated from the new City and County
Building. A canvass of attorneys and citizens showed practically a unanimous opinion that the jail should not be included in the new court house. Some of the objections to the
jail being in the new court house are that it brings to the building and to the Civic Center an undesirable class of people,
necessitates a frequent clanging of bells by the Police Department vehicles, necessitates the serving of food, the use of disinfectants and other things causing objectionable odors, and
that the City Jail should eventually be placed near the County
Jail on the square occupied by the County Jail and the West
Side Court Building in connection with a police administration building housing all of the Police Department's activities and Police Courts. The elimination of the jail has allowed the center portion of the west wing of the fourth floor
to be reserved for future use.
The Juvenile Court, under the previous plans, was located
on the fourth floor at the southeast end of the building, necessitating the large number of people, many of them children,
who use this court, to go through the central portion of the
building, use the elevators, then to the end of the building
to the quarters of the Juvenile Court. The committee
was of the opinion that the class of people using the Juvenile Court could be more conveniently served with much less
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traffic within the building by placing the quarters of the Juvenile Court in the southeast portion of the building on the first
floor, thus affording them the use of three outside entrances
near such quarters, one of them at the south end of the building adjoining the rooms to be occupied by the Juvenile Court,
and eliminating the necessity of their having to go through
other portions of the building.
The south portion of the fourth floor, which was to have
been occupied by the Juvenile Court, law library and part of
the jail, has been devoted to rooms properly finished for an art
gallery, thus substituting an art gallery for the rogues' gallery.
These quarters will accommodate the Junius Flagg Brown
collection of paintings which was bequeathed to the City of
Denver, providing that it be suitably housed within ten years
from the time of his death, which time expires June 5, 1932.
The gallery is finished and ready for the collection. The museum portion of the building will also provide for the Walter
Mead collection of Chinese and Japanese bronzes, ceramics,
paintings, furniture and embroideries, the Willis A. Marean
collection of Chinese and Japanese bronzes, ceramics and
paintings, and will suitably house other collections which may
be given to the city. It is estimated that the museum quarters
are of sufficient size to care for art museum purposes for approximately ten years, allowing for such period of time for
the erection of an art museum near the Civic Center.
The law library was changed from the southwest corner
of the fourth floor to the third floor. On the fourth floor have
been constructed two commodious jury's dormitories with accommodations for jurymen remaining on duty over night.
These were not included in the original plans.
The office of the Clerk of the County Court and the
County Court room were, under the previous plans, located on
the fourth floor, the Clerk's office being on the north curved
portion of the front, with the windows so high, and with the
granite balustrade in front of them, as to hide any view of the
outside except the sky. The quarters seemed quite out of
keeping with the needs of the office. Consequently the office
of the Clerk of the County Court and the County Court room
were changed to the second floor by the following arrangement: The east portion north of the center of the building on
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the curve, which had been allotted to the Clerk and Recorder
has been changed to offices for the Clerk of the County Court.
These offices were equipped for photostatic copy work with the
necessary dark rooms and plumbing and the Clerk's office of
the. County Court will be equipped for photostatic work in the
new building as facilities will then be available for such operations. Adjoining the general clerk's office, to the north, is a
spare room for use of attorneys and adjoining this room will
be an office for the Clerk and one for the Auditor with a reception room space in front of the two offices. The court room
on the northeast corner of the second floor will be used as the
County Court room.
The auditorium was eliminated and in its place has been
constructed the Clerk and Recorder's office on the second floor
and a record room and law library on the third floor above the
Clerk and Recorder's office. Some of the reasons for eliminating the auditorium are that it seemed inadvisable to have
convention meetings, musicales, lectures and the like which
were intended to be held in the auditorium during the time
the courts are in session on the same floor, that it is inadvisable to open the building at night in order to use the auditorium, that there are many auditoriums of the same size available near the City and County Building, that the City Council
chamber, which will accommodate two hundred and fifty
people, can be used for Bar Association meetings and other
meetings accommodating approximately this number, and that
there was no real need for an auditorium caring for approximately one thousand people in the City and County Building.
On the first floor, in the southwest corner, space has been
utilized for an extra Justice of the Peace court room with division clerk's office, and to space for the Election Commissioner with a considerable increase in size over present quarters. On the first floor, opposite one of the Justice Court
rooms, has been constructed a room for a generalClerk of the
Justice Courts. This space is to be reserved in the hope that
the City Charter may be amended to allow for one or two
extra Justices of the Peace and a general clerk for all Justice
Courts. These arrangements were not included in the original
plans.
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The law library, thirty feet by seventy feet on the third
floor, with a stairway leading from the second floor, is finished
in walnut with book stacks from floor to ceiling on all of the
wall space around the library room. Adjoining the room near
the entrance is a separate room for dictating so that attorneys
may use this room for conference or dictating without disturbing the general reading room. The library will be equipped
with four eight foot tables with four chairs at each table. This
is a most beautiful library room. The windows are high and
the entrance doors have translucent glass so that the library
room will be private and quiet. It is, in the opinion of the
committee, a beautiful and suitable room and will allow for
an extended expansion of our present law library.
By the changes in the plans as herein mentioned, the lawyers' work is principally confined to the first and second floors,
the first floor housing the Justice Courts and Juvenile Court
and the second floor housing the Clerk of the District Court,
Clerk of the County Court, five District Court rooms, County
Court rooms, two spare court rooms and the Clerk and Recorder's office. It also brings the law library close to the
courts. The efficiency of this plan in saving the time of
lawyers we trust will be easily appreciated.
On the fourth floor at the north end of the building there
are three finished court rooms for future growth and use.
The first floor west wing is devoted to the Fire Chief's
office, secretary's office and Fire Prevention Bureau with the
driveway for the Chief's vehicles directly in front-of his
offices.
The efficiency of the use of the building can be realized
from the fact that of the 409,140 square feet of total floor area
300,000 square feet is used for what is generally termed rentable floor area.
The cost of the building is $4,656,104.36; and of the
ground, $500,000.00; of the furniture and equipment to be
installed at this time $200,000.00; and approximately
$200,000.00 of furnishings and equipment are to be added,
making the building, grounds and equipment eventually cost
over five and one-half million dollars. The building will be
considered one of the architectural jewels of America and has
the additional virtue of being usable throughout with very
little waste space.
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It is expected that the courts will open the September
term in the new building. We are confident that attorneys
will be pleased with the arrangements for access through a
lobby to the court rooms, judges' chambers, division clerk's
offices and court reporter's rooms. The court room fixtures,
the furniture in the court rooms, judge's chamber, Mayor's
office, City Council chamber and law library, have been especially designed by the architect. The City Attorney's office
will be moved into the new building this month (May, 1932)
and various departments will be moved during July and
August. The entire building will be ready for occupancy
during September.
The present Public Library is to have the south side
changed and faced with an entrance to the building from the
Civic Center. A tunnel is to be constructed between the present library and the northeast end of the court house so that the
tunnel and some of the basement of the present building can
be utilized for the storage of little used volumes of the library.
A companion building to the present library is planned for
the south side of the Civic Center for use as a regional library,
the Carnegie Foundation being interested in the establishment
of a great library to serve this district comprising a number
of states.
The heating plant of the building is situated in the block
south of the new building so that the fire, smoke and dirt will
be distant from the building. The building is as nearly fireproof, both from the standpoint of construction and of position, as possible.
Your committee wishes to commend former Mayor
Stapleton and the Allied Architects for the general plan and
architecture of the structure, and to express its appreciation
to Mayor Begole and Roland L. Linder, architect, for the
utmost and cordial consideration which they have given the
suggestions and requests of the committee. Both have been
patient and efficient in the extreme to work out the interior of
the building, to make it suitable and adaptable for its purposes
and for the utmost convenience of the Bench and the Bar.
The detail of the work involved in making these changes
has been enormous. The committee has been untiring in its
effort and attention to endeavor to assist in working out the
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changes mentioned for the permanent benefit of the public,
officials, employees, the Bench and the Bar. We trust that
our work meets with the approval of the Bar as the committee
has been unanimous in every decision we have made.
Our incoming president, Mr. Gould, has announced that
the committee will be retained, and we shall proceed with
our work until the building and the courts are dedicated with
proper ceremonies.
The Fine Arts Committee of the City Club is endeavoring to arrange for a plan of decoration and ornamentation in
connection with the new building and the Civic Center which
can be carried out by gifts to the city in which work the Bar
can be of great assistance. Mrs. Robert W. Speer, widow
of former Mayor Speer, is donating the clock with Westminster chimes for the tower. The Speer Memorial Committee
is renewing its efforts for the erection of a beautiful piece of
sculpture work and pedestal.
Respectfully submitted,
HARRY C. DAVIS.
CHARLES A. MANTZ.
JAMES D. PARRIOTT.
GEORGE P. WINTERS.
FRANK L. FETZER,

Chairman.
DICTA DISSERTATIONS
Finish every day and be done with it. You have done what you could.
Some blunders and absurdities no doubt, crept in; forget them as soon as you
carL-Emerson.
What men want is not talent, it is purpose; not the power to achieve,
but the will to labor.-Bulwer Lytton.
Good impulses and good intentions do not make action right or safe.
In the long run, action is tested not by its motives, but by its results.-David
Starr Jordan.
Contentment comes neither by culture, nor by wishing; it is a reconciliation with one's lot, growing out of an inward superiority to our surroundings.-J. K. McLean.
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THE GOOD OLD COLLECTION LETTER
No. 5427
January 6, 1932.
Doe, Roe and Poe, Inc.,
Denver, Colorado.
Gentlemen:
Attention Electric Co. account $5.80
Greetings:
From information just at hand, we have been advised to file a Writ De
Computo against you to force payment of this account now, the cost of which
will fall upon you.
We have tried to favor you in this matter but you refuse to accept our
help, whereby payment could have been arranged without trouble with us;
therefore, you will be obliged to abide by the consequences.
Proper answer must be made to this office in person or by written statement on the back of this letter within five days, and your failure to make
correct answer will be taken as tacit acknowledgment of the account with
interest, as well as that you assume all costs added thereto.
Yours truly,
GETHEDOUGH SERVICE
I. N. Decipherable, Manager.

THE RETORT COURTEOUS
Gethedough Service,
Denver, Colorado.
January 11, 1932.
Gentlemen:
I have a client, Mr. Peter Poe, to whom you wrote on January 6th concerning a claim of $5.80 appearing to be an obligation of Doe, Roe and Poe,
Inc. This is to advise you that Mr. Poe is in no wise responsible for this bill,
nor did he incur the same.
You say in your letter that from information just at hand you have been
advised to file a Writ De Computo. Would it be asking too much of you
gentlemen to advise me as to just what this Writ De Computo is? Is it in
the nature of De Capitatus? What is the effect of it, and how does it affect
the right of the party on whom the same may be served to life and enjoying
life? Does the filing of this writ ipso facto have the effect of incarcerating
him in the county bastile? Does it deprive him of the companionship of his
family? Is it in the nature of a Bill of Attainder or Ex Post Facto law?
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Does it amount to a charge of criminal offense? Does it deprive him of
communion with his brothers in church? Does it compel him to wear his
hair short or long? Is it similar to a Writ of Quare Impedit, or of a Writ
De Rationabili Parte Bonorum, or of a Writ of Recaption, or a Writ Pro
Retorno Habendo, or a Writ of Proclamation, or a Writ De Odio Et Atia,
or a Writ of Mainprize, or a Writ of Inquisition, or a Writ De Homine
Replegiando, or a Writ of Haerectico Comburendo, or a Writ of Formedon,
or a Writ De Ejectione Firmea, or a Writ De Bono et Malo, or a writ of
Exigi Facias?
Being in the dark as to the nature of the proposed writ and effect of the
issuance of the same upon the life, liberty and happiness of my client, I will
appreciate it very much if you will answer in detail the information desired
and requested in this letter, so that I may properly advise my client whether
it is time to make his peace with his Maker, flee the country or ask benefit
of clergy.
Yours very truly,
I. Moore, Lawyer.
IML:MEJ

A ONE MAN BAR BANQUET
April 1, 1932.
Mr. A,
Byers, Colorado,
Dear Sir:
The matter of an account due from you in the sum of 60 to the Estate
of B, deceased, has been referred to the writer for consideration. The executor
has requested that I write you asking payment of the amount due.
Will you kindly forward check to cover the indebtedness to the office
of the writer at an early date?
Yours very truly,
C, Attorney.

THE OFFER OF THE WHEREWITHAL
No date.

Mr. C,
Denver, Colorado.
Kind sir as it is so hard for me to get any money, if you can come out here
I will give you a chicken for your dinner that will pay the 60 cents, I am
anxious for this to be settled. you can have a nice dinner of chicken &
knuddles for that small amount.
A,
Byers, Colo.

S. Trial Court Decisions..
The City and County of Denver vs. Donald Lowary. In the County Court,
No. 74977. Decision by Judge George A. Luxford.
Defendant was fined in the Denver Police Court for violation of Denver
city ordinance 119, Series 1931, and appealed to the County Court. Said
ordinance forbade any person to engage in the business of selling and/or
delivering coal, coke, wood, or charcoal in the City of Denver without having
a license, and further provided that no license should be granted to any person
not actually maintaining a coal yard with an office, scales of at least five tons
capacity, reasonable storage facilities, etc.
The evidence in the case showed that several hundred individuals, including defendant, had been engaged in hauling coal from adjoining coal fields
into the City of Denver and selling it, and that it was impossible for such
individuals to comply with the coal yard requirements of the ordinance.
Held: That the ordinance imposes an unreasonable burden upon individuals desiring to haul coal, etc., into Denver and sell the same, and it is
therefore in violation of the constitution and void. Defendant discharged and
case dismissed.
The Court relied principally upon Moffitt v. Pueblo, 55 Colo. 112.

Nixon vs. Continental Oil Company. In the District Court for the City and
County of Denver, No. A 2382. Decision by Judge C. C. Sackmann.
Plaintiff sues for damages from the death of her husband which resulted
from a collision of his automobile with an automobile operated by defendant
at the intersection of 17th Avenue and the Esplanade.
The second count of the complaint alleged that the agent of defendant,
who was operating its automobile, failed to yield to plaintiff's husband the
right of way, as is required by Section 1949 of the Municipal Code of the
City of Denver. Defendant moved to strike that paragraph of plaintiff's
complaint which set forth Section 1949 on the ground that the same was
"superseded and made void by act of the Legislature," meaning thereby the
Motor Vehicle Act of 1931. The defendant also demurred to the second
count of plaintiff's complaint on the ground that it stated no cause of action.
Held: Section 1949 of the Municipal Code is valid and controlling in
this case. Motion denied and demurrer overruled. Under the Twentieth
Amendment and its charter the City of Denver has exclusive jurisdiction over
the regulation of traffic within its corporate limits. While cases from other
jurisdictions have held that the regulation of traffic is not a municipal matter
so as to come within the exclusive jurisdiction of a home rule city, Denver's
charter gives it exclusive jurisdiction over municipal and local matters.

240

DICTA

The regulation of traffic and the rules for right of way within the city
of Denver are essentially local to it, the conditions within the city being very
different from conditions on country highways. The provisions of the 1931
Motor Vehicle Act which purport to give the right of way to the vehicle first
entering "the intersection" are very indefinite in that it cannot be told what
kind of an intersection is meant or at what point a vehicle enters an intersection. The ordinance of the City in this case being very specific on the point,
it is possible to uphold both the 1931 act and the ordinance, which is always
done whenever possible, in accordance with well settled principles.

F. Everett Fields vs. Gladys Oneal Fields. In the District Court, No. A
3580. Decision by Judge Geo. F. Dunklee. Ruling of Court on Motion to
Reassign Case.
THE COURT: The above case is a suit for divorce.
The defendant duly appeared within the time to plead and filed a motion
entitled, "Motion to reassign," in the following words, to-wit:
"Comes now the defendant by her attorneys, Van Cise and Robinson and
Philip S. Van Cise, and under the provisions of Rule Two, Section Three,
Rules of the Court, moves the Court to order the re-assignment of the above
entitled action."
Said motion was duly set for hearing and the attorney for the plaintiff
appeared and objected to the granting of the motion.
The Court having heard argument thereon took the matter under advisement, and now being sufficiently advised in the premises rules as follows:
First. Since the time when the business of the District Court increased
to the extent that more than one Judge was provided by law to discharge the
judicial duties of the Court there has been more or less contention among
some of the attorneys to get cases before some particular Judge, or some particular Division, with the result that certain Rules as amended, to-wit, Rule
II, Sec. 2, requires all cases to be assigned by lot by the Presiding Judge in
open Court, thereby preventing the juggling of cases.
Sec. 3 of Rule II is as follows:
"The Judge of any Civil Division to which a case has been assigned may
order the reassignment thereof, which reassignment shall be made in the
manner provided by Section 2 hereof, except that said case shall retain its same
number."
Sec. 4 of said Rule is as follows:
"Where all parties agree, the Judge of any Civil Division may transfer
a case to another Civil Division upon consent of the Judge of the Division to
which it is proposed to transfer the case."
Second. Sec. 32, being in Chapter 2, Civil Code of Procedure, C. L.
1921, at Page 107, provides among other things:
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"If either party in any civil action which may be depending in any
District or County Court, shall fear that he will not receive a fair trial in the
Court in which the action is pending, on account that the Judge is interested
or prejudiced, or is related to or shall have been of counsel for either party,
or is related to the counsel for either party, * * * such party may apply
to the Court in Term time, or the Judge thereof in vacation, by petition setting
forth the cause of application and praying a change of venue, accompanied by
an affidavit verifying the facts in the petition stated and reasonable notice of
the application having been given to the other party or his attorney."
Third. The legal question presented is as to whether said Section Three
shall be construed as giving the right to a party to a suit to have in effect a
change of venue, or reassignment of a case, and have the same tried in another
Division and before another Judge without assigning any reason therefor as
provided by the said Section of the Code.
Fourth. The Court finds from the records and files of the Clerk's
Office, that a custom or practice has started since the adoption of said "Rule
II," by one of the attorneys for plaintiff or defendant going to the Judge of
the Division where the case fell by lot and asking that the case be reassigned
to another Division, or by filing a written motion under said Sec. 3.
The Judges usually in a spirit of good fellowship not wishing to try a
case where one party has made such a request or motion, orders it reassigned
over the objection of the other party.
Among the files and records of such cases I have one before me where
the opposing attorney objected and assigned it as error in a motion for a
new trial.
In another, the case was so transferred so that it was in three different
Divisions of this Court before finally tried. The legal effect of this custom
and practice of reassigning of cases where reassignment is asked without pointing out any cause, if permitted to continue by the Court, is to permit cases to
be juggled from Division to Division and from Judge to Judge contrary to
law and the Rules of Court.
My position as a matter of law and public policy is stated in Judge
Butler's Opinion in the case of People v. District Court, 84 Colo. 367,
Opinion 368.
Fifth. The Court FINDS and RULES, in this case, that said Sec.
3 of Rule II, does not, and was not intended to take the place of said Sec. 32
of the Civil Code.
Said Sec. 3 was intended, and is hereby construed, to mean that if the
Judge knows of any reason why he should not properly hear or try the case,
that the Judge, upon his own motion, should order it reassigned.
Sixth. I know of no reason why I should not hear or try this case, and
none has been pointed out. Therefore, for the reasons heretofore stated the
objection is sustained and the motion denied.

(EDIToR'S NOTE.-It is intended to print brief abstracts of the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the issue of Dicta next appearing after the rendition thereof. In the
event of the filing of a petition for rehearing, resulting in any change or modification
of opinion, such will be indicated in later digests.)

CONTRACTS-DAMAGES-SHIPMENTS OF POTATOES-FREEZING--CONFIRMING SALE-EFFECT OF-The Jagger Produce Co. vs. Gylling--No. 12619

-Decided

April 11, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.

1. Where a seller of 'potatoes sells through an agent, seller claiming
a straight sale and buyer claiming the potatoes were sold through agreement
with agent that they should be sorted at destination, and the amount of damages or worthless potatoes deducted, resolves itself into disputed question of
fact as to what the contract was, and the verdict of the jury finding the contract to be as plaintiff alleged, will not be disturbed.
2. Where the seller resides at a different place than the agent and
buyer, and the agent advises seller of a straight sale without deduction for
damages or worthless or frozen potatoes and sends confirmation of sale by
writing, advising seller of sale and price without qualification of deductions

for spoiled potatoes, and send copy of confirmation to buyer, this was ample
notice to buyer that seller was relying on a contract of sale without qualifications and imposed on buyer the duty to promptly protest if he did not
acquiesce.-Judgment afflrmed.

TO-TIME oF-NECESSITY OF-CONSTITUTIONALITY-The Pine-Martin Mining Co. vs. The Empire Zinc Co.-No.
12573-DecidedApril 18, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
1. An application for hearing of the issue of the right to condemn land
is made in apt time when it is made before the calling of a jury to assess
CONDEMNATION-RIGHT

damages.
2. Where a period of 11 years elapsed between the commencement of
condemnation proceedings and the hearing thereon, it was proper for the
court to consider the situation as it existed at the time of the hearing on the
right to condemn.
3. Where the right to condemn existed at the time of the commencement of the action, the fact that later developments showed that the enterprise was a failure and was not feasible, and that the right of way was not
needed, would not defeat the action, as the question of necessity is not for the
court to determine, but is for the commissioners appointed by the court to
determine.
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4. Article XVI, Sec. 7 giving private persons a right of way across
private lands for construction of ditches, flumes and canals is not in conflict
with the Federal Constitution.-Judgment reversed.

QUIET TITLE-TAX

DEED>--EFFECT

IF WITHHOLDING

A DEED FROM

REcORI-Moore, as Receiver vs. The Chalmers-GallowayLive Stock Co.No. 12712-DecidedApril 18, 1932-Opnion by Mr. Justice Burke.

1. Where action is dismissed as to a receiver for a company and hearing proceeds, the party dismissing waives any error in the court having permitted the receiver to open up a judgment after three terms of court had
elapsed.
2. Where the receiver to sustain his title, relies upon an unrecorded
deed, executed prior to the passage of the recording act of March 28, 1927, as
superior to the rights of one holding under a tax deed, without notice of the
existing unrecorded deed, his rights are to be determined by the recording act
of March 28, 1927, and he is without standing in court.
3. The recording act of March 28, 1927, applies to an unrecorded
deed, executed prior to the date 'f the act.
4. The said act is not unconstitutional.-Judgment affirmed.

WITNESSES--ExPERT

TESTIMONY-HYPOTHETICAL

QUESTIONS--OPINION

BASED ON ALL THE EVmENCE-Callahan's Guardian vs.

Callahan-No.

12656-DecidedApril 18, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.

1. It is not necessary in all cases that the opinion of an expert witness
be based upon a hypothetical question.
2. Where the expert witness has been present through the trial, and
heard all the testimony in regard to the alleged insanity of a testator, a hypothetical question can be dispensed with and the witness may be asked to state
his opinion based upon the evidence he has heard, at least, where the evidence
is not conflicting.
3.

Where lay witnesses are permitted to testify as to their opinion

concerning the mental condition of the testator, and differ as to their opinion,
this does create a conflict in facts but merely a conflict in conclusions.
4. Where plaintiff in error, upon cross-examination of expert, asks
his opinion based upon all or part of the evidence, he has waived the right to
object to similar evidence elicited in the same manner by proponent of will.Judgment affirmed.
WORKMENS

COMPENSATION-INSUFFICIENCY

OF FINDINGS

OF COMMIS-

SION-Duras vs. Industrial Commission et al.-No. 13013-Decided 4pril
25, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Alter.

1. It is the duty of the Industrial Commission to make sufficiently
detailed findings of fact so that the courts can determine whether the order
or award is supported by the facts.
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2. Where the Commission, in making an award, fails to make findings
as to whether the employee was an employee within the provisions of Workmens Compensation; as to whether he accidentally sustained injuries growing
out of and in the course of his employment; as to whether it was an accidental injury and the nature of it, the award is insufficient.-Judgment reversed with directions to make specific findings.

ELECTION OF REMEDIES-MORTGAGE LIEN-No WAIVER BY DIRECT SUIT
ON NOTE-Greene vs. Wilson-No. 12996-Decided April 25, 1932-

Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
1. Where plaintiff brought suit at law upon a promissory note and
obtained judgment, instead of foreclosing his lien on a trust deed securing
said note, and thereafter brought suit against the judgment defendant and
his wife to set aside a fraudulent conveyance to the wife in order to subject
said real estate to his judgment lien, it was no defense to the action that the
plaintiff should have first pursued his remedy in equity for foreclosure of his
mortgage lien.
2. A mortgagee of land may sue on the note alone, or sue to foreclose
alone, or join both proceedings in one action.
3. A mortgagee of land may sue on the note alone and after judgment
sue to set aside a fraudulent conveyance which would defeat his judgment lien
and he need not first exhaust his mortgage security.
4. In such a case, he has two liens, and it is for him to determine which
he will enforce first.
5. The lower court erred in dismissing the suit on the ground that
plaintiff had not exhausted the trust deed security before commencing suit.Judgment reversed.
ADMINISTRATORS

AND

EXECUTORS-WIDOW's

ALLOWANCE-IN

WHAT

CLASs-Eisenberg vs. Reininger-No. 12932-Decided April 25, 1932Opinion by Mr. Justice Moore.
1. The statutory widow's allowance is a claim of the Fourth Class.Judgment reversed.
Mr. Justice Campbell, Mr. Justice Burke and Mr. Justice Butler
dissent. The dissenting opinion holds that the widows allowance under the
amendment of 1929 shall be allowed to her and retained by her as her sole
and separate property and therefore it cannot be the property of the estate
and likewise cannot be applied to the payment of any claims or demands
against the estate or to the payment of expenses of administration.

INSURANCE-

ACCIDENT-

TORNADO-

OCCUPATIONAL

DUTIES

-

Federal

Life Insurance Co. vs. Hall-No. 13068-Decided April 25, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
1. Where a ranchman carried an accident insurance policy and was
temporarily engaged in rough carpenter work on a shed and was killed by the
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shed being overturned by an extraordinarily heavy wind, he did not come
within the terms of the policy which excluded liability for death while performing occupational duties.
2. The term 'occupation' as used in accident policies refers to insured's
ordinary and usual business, neither to recreational activities nor to incidental
nor temporary employment.
3. Where the policy provided for payment of loss in case of death by
"cyclone or tornado" it is no defense that the wind which overturned the
building and caught the insured underneath, thereby killing him, might not
be technically a cyclone or tornado. Where the evidence shows that the wind
came suddenly in the form of a "twister" covering a distance of about 50 feet
on the ground and when it struck the building it had sufficient violence to uproot the building, tear it from its foundation and hurl it a distance of 18 feet,
such a wind was some form at least of a tornado and came within the terms
of the policy.-Judgment for beneficiary affirmed.

PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS-REVOCATION OF LICENSE-AUTHORITY OF
STATE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMIIERS-Sapero vs. State Board of Medi-

cal Examiners-No. 13029-Decided April 25, 1932-Opinion by Mr.
Chief Justice Adams.

1. The State Board of Medical Examiners has no power to revoke
the license of a physician on the ground that he is guilty of immoral, unprofessional and dishonorable conduct where such conduct consists simply in
carrying advertisements in various town papers that he will visit the town at
a certain time and that he treats various diseases successfully.
2. The State Medical Examiners Board has no legislative powers delegated to it by the general assembly.
3. The general assembly may not delegate the power to make a law
but it may delegate power to a board of Medical examiners to determine some
fact or things upon which the law depends.
4. The canons of ethics of medical association not being in the record,
QUAERE, and with reference to professional advertising, would a mere
breach of such ethics, constitute dishonorable or unprofessional conduct?
5. The statute is the sole source of the power of the board and the fact
that it may be more capable than any one else of determining the standards
of the medical profession cannot make it the sole judge of a physician's conduct. The courts still retain this power and cannot delegate their judicial
duties.

6. A physician's license cannot be revoked merely for violating professional ethics or the rules of a board of health; to be actionable, it must
amount to a breach of law.-Judgment reversed. Mr. Justice Butler specially
concurring.
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CRIMINAL LAW-CONFIDENCE GAME-SUFFICIENCY OF INFORMATIONSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE-Arnett vs. the People-No. 12750-Decided

April 25, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Moore.
1. Defendants were convicted in the court below of obtaining money
by means of the confidence game. The information charged in substance that
the defendant did then and there unlawfully and feloniously obtain and procure from one W. F. Cross the sum of $409 in lawful money of the United
States by means and by use of the confidence game. Such information stated
the crime of obtaining money by means of the confidence game.
2. It is not necessary in such information to allege ownership of the
money.
3. Where the evidence showed that defendants received checks instead
of cash, there was no variance between allegations and proof. It would be
ridiculous to hold that such a variance constitutes reversible error.-Judgment

affirmed.
CONVERSION-PLEADING-SUFFICIENCY

OF

COMPLAINT-MEASURE

OF

DAMAGEs-Barkhausen vs. Bulkley-No. 12617-Decided April 25, 1932
-Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
1. A complaint, in conversion, alleging that plaintiff's stock certificates,
representing capital stock of Cities Service Company, were properly in the
possession of the defendant at the time of the alleged conversion and had been
deliveied by plaintiff to defendant as collateral security for the payment of
her indebtedness to him as part of the purchase price of the stock, fails to state
an action for conversion and was subject to attack by general demurrer.

2.

Such complaint is defective in failing to allege a demand before suit

was commenced or that defendant refused to comply with the demand.
3. The measure of damages is the market value of the stock on the day
converted and complaint is defective in alleging as the measure of damages,
the value at some other time.-Judgment affirmed.

CRIMES -

MURDER

-

FIRST DEGREE -

PREMEDITATION -

EVIDENCE OF-

Maestis v. People-No. 13019-Decided May 2, 1932-Opinion by Mr.
Justice Alter.
1. Where defendant was convicted of first degree murder, "
the proof must establish deliberation and premeditation to support the verdict.
Time, however, is not essential if there was a design and determination to
kill formed in the mind of the defendant, previously to or at the time the
mortal wound was given. It matters not how short the interval, if it was
sufficient for one thought to follow another and the defendant actually formed
the design to kill, and deliberated and premeditated upon such design before
firing the fatal shot, * * * Under these acts, premeditation and deliberation
are matters of inference and presumption to be drawn by the jury from the
facts and circumstances leading up to, surrounding and explanatory of the

homicide."--Judgment affirmed.

DICTA
oF-RIGHT TO TAX COUNTIES--People v. Board of
County Commissioners of Weld County-No. 12624-Decided May 2,
1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.

TAXATION-POWER

1. The General Assembly did not intend to tax gasoline used in propelling motor vehicles on public streets or highways in the State of Colorado,
when such vehicles are being used in constructing, maintaining or repairing
the highways.
2. Power to tax municipalities and counties is established by statute.
The statute does not contemplate, however, a gasoline tax when such gasoline
is used by the county or municipality in the construction, maintenance and
repair of its highways.-Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.

DOCTORS-Locke v. Wyke-No.
12632-Decided May 2, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Moore.

NEGLIGENCE-MALPRACTICE-MEDICAL

1. In an action alleging negligent diagnosis and treatment, when the
evidence discloses that the diagnosis made by the Doctor was correct and that
the treatment was the same as would have been followed by reliable practitioners, it is error to deny a directed verdict for the defendant.-Judgment
reversed and remanded.

EAT AND DRINK
AT THE FINEST GRILL IN THE WEST

Saliman &Sons Delicatessen and Grill
NOW OPEN, OPPOSITE COURT HOUSE
Corner Fifteenth and Tremont Streets

Phone KEystone 5548

THE TYPEWRITER EXCHANGE, Inc.
New and Rebuilt

TYPEWRITERS
Rentals and Repairs
911 17th St., DENVER

COMPLIMENTS OF

ALEXANDER J. LINDSAY AND COMPANY
CERTIFIED

PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

TAX CONSULTANTS
SECURITY

BUILDING

DENVER

Kemper-Power Investigation Service
UCENSED BONDED DETECTIVE AGENCY
INTERNATIONAL CONNECTIONS

622 SYMES BUILDING
Phone MAin 7763
DIVORCE INVESTIGATIONS

PROCESS SERVING

ROGERS

41 Va

A SERVICE ..... of noteworthy character, combined
with moderate cost. Last year 53% of our adult services
were conducted at an average charge of less than $245.
And everything is so complete that extra charges are unknown.

ROGERS MORTUARY
Phone TAbor 5351

D ENVE R

1544 Lincoln Street

PUT YOUR LEGAL ADVERTISING IN

The Colorado Graphic
Fifty Years of Satisfactory Service
711 Seventeenth Street

KE,ystone 4011

Personal Appearance

. ..

The sparkle oF the Fabric, the new-like Feel which
comes From our Form-shape pressing, will tell you
that it's been done by Denver's leading cleaner.
I
Colfax at Ogden

CLEAJ.ERS & DYERS

MAin 6161

A beaui ul new brochure of emnossed
stationery has just been prepare .
Phone or write for your copy.

"e W. H1!. Kistler Stalionery Co.
1B36

MAIN

CHAMPA

B1

FLONVERS and DECORATIONS
FLOWERS ANYWHERE BY WIRE SERVICE
Dependahility

823 - 17th Street

V

-

Distinction

Denver National Building

TAbor 5521

Your Help Will Be Apprecated .....
in helping to locate the following books lost from
the Denver Bar Association Library:
Shepard's Colorado Citations, 1908 & 1929 Bound Volumes, and Current Paper Advance
Sheet.
Vol. 16 Colorado Appeals.
Vol. 17 Illinois.
Vols. 120 and 203 Illinois Appeals.
Book 25, Lawyer's Reports Annotated.
Books 30 and 46, United States Supreme Court Reports.
Please check your own iibrarin for these books.
DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION LIBRARY.

1

I

TRUST BANKING
for
CORPORATIONS and INDIVIDUALS

Services to Corporations
Trustee under Corporate Mortgages . . . Deposi-

tary for Protective Committees... TransferAgent
and Registrar for Corporate Stocks .

. .

Miscel-

laneous Fiscal Agencies.
0

Services to Individuals and Families
Executor and Administrator of Estates ...

Trus-

tee under Wills... Trustee of Living Trusts and
Life Insurance Trusts.. Safe-keeping of Securities.
0

Escrows
BUSINESS SERVICE FOR BUSINESS MEN
AND WOMEN AND THEIR COUNSEL.

THE INTERNATIONAL TRUST COMPANY
THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL BANK
THE AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK
THE DENVER NATIONAL BANK
THE COLORADO NATIONAL BANK

